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Abstract
We review some of the most significant issues and results on the economic effects of
genetically modified (GM) product innovation, with emphasis on the question of GM
labeling and the need for costly segregation and identity preservation activities. The
analysis is organized around an explicit model that can accommodate the features of both
first-generation and second-generation GM products. The model accounts for the
proprietary nature of GM innovations and for the critical role of consumer preferences
vis-à-vis GM products, as well as for the impacts of segregation and identity preservation
and the effects of a mandatory GM labeling regulation. We also investigate briefly a
novel question in this setting, the choice of“research direction”when both cost-reducing
and quality-enhancing GM innovations are feasible.
Keywords: identity preservation, labeling, market failure, product differentiation,
welfare.
LABELING REGULATIONS AND SEGREGATION OF FIRST- AND
SECOND-GENERATION GENETICALLY MODIFIED PRODUCTS:
INNOVATION INCENTIVES AND WELFARE EFFECTS
Introduction
The first nine years of genetically modified (GM) crops, since their introduction in
1996, have been a mixed success. Adoption has been fast and extensive by any standard,
reaching a worldwide area of 200 million acres in 2004 (James 2005). But large-scale
adoption has been confined to a handful of countries,1 and, perhaps most important, the
advent of GM crops has met with considerable public opposition and a flurry of new
restrictive regulations. In the European Union (EU), in particular, the initial laissez-faire
attitude, which allowed several GM products to be approved, was reversed in 1998 with
the introduction of a de facto moratorium on new GM products. Only in 2004 did pro-
gress appear with the unveiling of a new and extensive framework for GM approvals and
marketing. Ostensibly meant to foster food safety, protect the environment, and ensure
consumers’“right to know,”the new (and already controversial) system is centered on
the notions of mandatory GM labeling and traceability (European Union 2004). Mean-
while, the strain that the EU moratorium and GM regulations can have on trade has
become apparent (Lapan and Moschini 2001; Sheldon 2002) and the prospects for its
resolution are rather uncertain. A central question, it seems, concerns the economic
effects of the GM product innovation, including both intended and unintended effects.
Assessing the economic implications of the introduction of GM products continues
to be a challenging endeavor. It has become clear over time that a critical element of this
new technology concerns consumers’acceptance. A portion of consumers clearly has a
negative perception of food produced from GM products, at least based on what one can
conclude from consumer surveys (e.g., Gaskell, Allum, and Stares 2003) and experimen-
tal results (e.g., Huffman et al. 2003; Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux 2004). Furthermore,
the first generation of GM crops, characterized by agronomic traits such as herbicide
resistance and pest resistance, offered no direct benefit to consumers. Hence, from a
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consumer perspective, GM innovation has produced what Lapan and Moschini (2004)
call“weakly inferior”substitutes. The fact that GM food is not a perfect substitute for
conventional food per se simply implies a smaller potential market for the new GM
products. But the introduction of first-generation GM crops means that, to deliver tradi-
tional GM-free food, additional costs must be incurred (relative to the pre-innovation
situation). That is, costly (and hitherto unnecessary) segregation and identity preservation
activities are required. Essentially, therefore, the GM innovation process has also intro-
duced a new market failure, a type of externality on the production of traditional food
products (Lapan and Moschini 2001).
Consumer acceptance is likely to be different for GM products that offer output traits
of direct interest to end users, such as improved nutritional content (e.g., increased
vitamin content, as in the widely publicized“golden rice”). This defines so-called sec-
ond-generation GM products (Pew Initiative 2001). But whereas the attribute of the
innovation may be of interest, per se, to consumers, the fact remains that the GM nature
of the innovation is likely to continue to play a role in consumer acceptance. Hence, a
sound economic assessment of the effects of GM product innovation needs to address
directly the question of consumer preferences and how these interact with the nature of
the market failure discussed in the foregoing.
In this paper we propose to review some of the most significant issues and studies
that have dealt with the economic effects of GM product innovation. We will pay particu-
lar attention to the question of GM labeling and its relation to the need for costly
segregation and identity preservation activities. To organize some of the main findings to
date, we develop an explicit, simple model that can accommodate the features of both so-
called first-generation and second-generation GM products. This model explicitly ac-
counts for the effects of consumer preferences vis-à-vis GM products, as well as for the
distinct impacts of segregation and identity preservation, and the effects of an EU-style
GM labeling regulation. We also investigate briefly a novel question in this setting,
specifically, the choice of“research direction”when both cost-reducing and quality-
enhancing GM innovations are feasible.
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The Economics of Labeling
Much has been written on the scope, merit, and effects of food labeling regulations.2
An important distinction, for our purposes, is between“voluntary labeling”and“manda-
tory labeling.” Voluntary labeling strategies naturally arise as firms compete in the
marketplace and try to differentiate their products from that of competitors. The underly-
ing assumption is that firms’products are in fact differentiated (in some dimension) and
that consumers may value a product’s specific attributes that labeling emphasizes. Here it
is assumed that firms have some information that may be useful to consumers, that such
attributes are not easily observable by consumers prior to the purchase, and that a label
can credibly disclose the information about the“quality”of the good that consumers
desire. Thus one is dealing with“experience goods”or“credence goods,”rather than
“search goods.”3 An issue that arises in this setting is whether firms disclose truthful
information and whether they disclose all of the information. For positive attributes it is
obviously in the strategic interest of firms to disclose the information, but more generally
Grossman (1981) shows that, when consumers make rational inferences and assume that
undisclosed attributes are of the worst possible quality, there is a powerful market incen-
tive for full disclosure of information. The credibility of voluntary labeling can be
enhanced by third-party services (producer associations, consumer groups, governments)
that may supply standards, testing services, and certification.
Mandatory labeling is typically harder to justify on economic grounds for a number
of reasons. The presumption again is that there is asymmetric information: firms know
something that consumers do not, and the latter would benefit from disclosure. But to
advocate mandatory disclosure, one has to postulate that firms would not reveal the
information without government intervention. Thus one must assume that various forms
of“screening”or“signaling”that are feasible in the marketplace do not yield a desirable
outcome in this setting. Often there may be much better policy tools, depending on the
specific situation (bans, production standards, etc.).
Labeling of Genetically Modified Products: Segregation and Identity Preservation
Some general issues concerning biotech labeling are discussed by Teisl and Caswell
(2003) and Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell (2001). One recurrent hypothesis, in discussions
of GM food labeling, is that the good in question is a pure“credence good,”whereby the
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true attribute of interest to the consumer cannot be observed after consumption. Many
studies uncritically presume that non-GM goods in this case are credence goods and that
is taken as sufficient evidence of a market failure to warrant government intervention.
But, arguably, GM products are not really prototypical“credence goods.”It is in fact
possible to uncover the nature of the product by“testing.”Testing could be done by
organizations, rather than by individuals, and need not be systematic: not every unit
needs to be tested insofar as the outcome of testing can implicate a“brand.”4
The presumption of“asymmetric”information (between firms and consumers) may
oversimplify the issue as well in the context of GM labeling. Unlike Akerlof’s (1970)
classic problem, here the relevant information of interest to the consumer (i.e., the non-
GM nature of the superior product) needs to be“produced”(by costly segregation,
identity preservation, and systematic testing). Thus, in this context it is critical to distin-
guish between the“information”that needs to be created to supply consumers with a
meaningful choice and the actual information disclosed by a label.
Segregation and identity preservation systems are sometimes held to mean different
things, the latter entailing a higher degree of traceability for instance (e.g., Smyth and
Phillips 2002). Here, however, there is no point in separating these concepts, and thus we
will think of a segregation and identity preservation (SIP) system as the set of production,
handling, processing, and distribution practices that maintain the purity of the good under
consideration. To ensure the non-GM nature of the product, various costly activities need
to be undertaken at various stages of the vertical production chain, from“farm to fork.”
Such activities may involve the need for seed of an appropriate degree of purity, isolation
measures at the growing stage to prevent cross-pollination, clean and/or dedicated
equipment for planting and harvesting, clean and/or dedicated storage and transportation
facilities, segregated handling and processing facilities, and so on. In addition, of course,
record keeping and multiple testing at various stages may be necessary (Bullock and
Desquilbet 2002; Sundstrom et al. 2002).
The nature of such SIP activities has direct implications for the working of a GM la-
beling system. In some sense it is true that, because of the binary nature of the
information (a product either is or is not GM), both positive and negative labels, when
present, should convey the same information to consumers. But one cannot ignore the
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SIP costs that are necessary for the label“non-GM,”or the absence of a label“GM,”to
be meaningful or credible in this setting. In particular, it is clear that simply requiring that
GM products identify themselves as such by an EU-type mandatory labeling requirement
does not diminish the costly segregation activities that are required by the suppliers of the
(unlabeled) non-GM product.
Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell (2001) conclude that the potential of GM labeling for
the purpose of addressing problems of missing or asymmetric information is limited. The
question of the appropriate type of GM labeling was also discussed by Runge and Jack-
son (2000) in the context of a choice between“positive labeling”(e.g., this product
contains GM organisms) and“negative labeling”(e.g., this product does not contain GM
organisms). Crespi and Marette (2003) contrast some of the implications of voluntary and
mandatory labeling regimes but neglect to consider explicitly SIP costs. As emphasized
by Lapan and Moschini (2001), it is critical to understand the incentive-compatibility
requirements of alternative labeling systems. The first generation of GM products essen-
tially confers no attribute that is directly desirable from the consumers’point of view.
Hence, a positive labeling for first-generation GM products would need to be mandatory
whereas a negative labeling system in this setting could be voluntary. But either labeling
system, to be credible, must impose SIP costs on the non-GM good. An explicit two-
country trade model with costly SIP and GM labeling is developed by Lapan and Mo-
schini (2001, 2004), in which mandatory GM labeling is taken as adding costs to GM
producers without detracting from SIP costs incurred by non-GM suppliers. Fulton and
Giannakas (2004) analyze labeling and no-labeling regimes, with IP costs affecting the
marketing margin for the non-GM product (but with no differentiation between voluntary
and mandatory labeling systems).
The New Genetically Modified Labeling and Traceability Rules in the
European Union
Whereas many countries are introducing GM labeling requirements (Carter and Gru-
ere 2003), the sweeping nature of EU rules deserves special attention. Since April 2004,
GM food and feed in the EU are regulated under Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003 “on 
geneticaly modified food and feed.” This framework provides for a single EU procedure 
for the authorization of all food and feed derived from GM products and of GM products
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themselves. Furthermore, since April 2004, products consisting of or containing GM
organisms and food products obtained from GM organisms are also subject to traceability
and labeling requirements as established in Regulation (EC) 1830/2003 “concerning the 
traceability and labeling of genetically modified organisms and the traceability of food
and feed products produced from genetically modified organisms and amending Directive
2001/18/EC” (European Union 2004).
The EU“mandatory labeling”of GM products specifically requires that all pre-
packaged products consisting of or containing (authorized) GM material and food prod-
ucts produced from GM products must carry a label stating that“This product contains
genetically modified organisms”or“This product contains genetically modified [name of
organism(s)].”In the case of non-prepackaged products (such as food offered by restau-
rants), these words must appear with the display of the product. GM foods must be
labeled regardless of whether or not DNA or proteins derived from genetic modification
are contained in the final product, and thus the GM labeling requirement also pertains to
highly refined products (e.g., vegetable oil). The same labeling rules apply to animal
feed, including any compound feed that contains GM products (e.g., soybeans or maize)
or that is derived from GM products (e.g., corn gluten feed).
The mandate of “traceability” states that al persons who place a GM product on the 
market or receive a GM product placed on the market within the EU must be able to
identify their supplier and the companies to which the products have been supplied. Opera-
tors handling GM product must transmit in writing to those receiving the product
information to the effect that the product in question is of GM origin and the unique
identifier(s) assigned to those GM products. Operators must hold the information for a
period of five years from each transaction and be able to identify the operator by whom and
to whom the products have been made available. The regulation covers all GM products
that have received EU authorization for their placing on the market, including previously
authorized GM product transacted in bulk quantities (e.g., soybean and maize).
Exemption from the requirement of GM labeling and traceability includes products ob-
tained from animals fed with genetically modified feed (e.g., meat, milk, or eggs).
Conventional products are also not subject to traceability and labeling. Conventional
products that are accidentally contaminated by GM products must carry the GM label only
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if the (authorized) GM organism content exceeds 0.9 percent, provided the presence of this
material is adventitious or technically unavoidable. In this case, operators must be able to
demonstrate that they have taken adequate measures to avoid the presence of GM material.5
To summarize, it seems clear that the new EU rules impose substantial costs on the
suppliers of GM products. In order to fulfill the traceability requirements, for instance,
each operator must have a system that allows the information to be kept and made
available to public authorities on demand, to document each transaction that took place
for the last five years. For example, a company selling GM seed would have to inform
buyers that the seed is GM and provide more information so the specific GM organism
can be precisely identified. The company is also obliged to keep a register of business
operators who have bought the seed. The farmer would have to inform any purchaser of
the harvest that the product is GM and keep a register of operators to whom he has made
the harvest available. Downstream handlers and processors also need to undertake similar
steps as they carry out market transactions that involve GM products. As noted by
Buckwell, Brookes, and Bradley (1999), a critical element determining the cost of SIP
activities is the purity threshold level that is sought; the 0.9 percent level prescribed by
EU rules appears to be very strict.
The mandatory nature of the EU system is in sharp contrast with the regulatory ap-
proach pursued in the United States, where—at most—a voluntary GM labeling system
can be envisioned (U.S. FDA 2001). What is unclear is whether, by mandating explicit
disclosure of everything GM that goes through the system, the EU rules may in fact
decrease somewhat the implementation of a SIP system for non-GM products. Many of
the real costs of such a SIP system would seem to be unaffected. Thus, to a first approxi-
mation at least, we will construe the new rules as (i) increasing the cost of supplying GM
products, and (ii) leaving unchanged the SIP costs of supplying non-GM products.
Finally we will note that at this point it is unclear what sort of monitoring system will be
in place to enforce the new EU system. That this may be a challenging task is apparent,
for example, when one notes that the mandatory disclosure for highly refined products
(e.g., vegetable oils) appears to be an open invitation to cheat.
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The Model
The simple model we develop here captures the main economic elements of interest
and, in fact, can accommodate the features of both first-generation and second-generation
GM innovations. The pre-innovation situation is characterized by a conventional product
that is supplied competitively. We simplify the analysis substantially here by considering
a constant-returns-to-scale industry. Whereas this assumption may be consistent with an
individual (small) agricultural industry, it clearly cannot apply to the agricultural sector
as a whole (because of the inelastic supply of land, for example), so a generalization of
the setup to an increasing-cost industry (as in Lapan and Moschini 2004, for example) is
desirable. But with our simplifying assumption, the pre-innovation conventional product
is assumed to be produced with a constant unit production cost equal to c . This conven-
tional product also has a given quality, and without loss of generality we normalize that
quality to equal unity.
In this framework, a GM innovation can work in two directions: it can increase effi-
ciency by reducing the unit production cost c and/or it can increase the quality level of
the product. The first type of efficiency-enhancing innovations characterizes the so-called
first-generation GM products, which embody agronomic traits such as herbicide-resistant
soybeans and cotton, and Bt maize and cotton (for example).6 An increase in the quality
of the product, on the other hand, is what so-called second-generation GM products are
attempting to do (Pew Initiative 2001). For such products, the attribute contributed by
GM innovation is of direct interest to the user of the product, such as improved nutri-
tional content (e.g., increased vitamin content, asin “golden rice”).
Specifically, a given GM innovation (labeled by the subscript i) is modeled as de-
creasing unit cost from c to ic a and increasing quality from 1 to 1 ib . Of course, the
polar cases of a pure first-generation GM product ( 0ib  ) and a pure second-generation
GM product ( 0ia  ) are readily encompassed by this framework. The pre-innovation
conventional product and the potential new GM product are illustrated in Figure 1.
Preferences
Consumers are assumed to have heterogeneous preferences with respect to the new
product. Following Mussa and Rosen (1978), we represent individual preferences through
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c
ic a
1 ib1
quality
unit cost
●
●
conventional
product
new GM
product
FIGURE 1. A genetic modification innovation combining efficiency enhancement and
quality improvement
a simplified vertical product differentiation model (see also Tirole 1988, chap. 7). Spe-
cifically, the individual consumer with preference parameter  0,1 obtains the
following utility levels by consuming the two possible products:
0 0V u p  if the consumer buys one unit of conventional product (1)
(1 )i i iV b u p    if the consumer buys one unit of GM product (2)
where 0u is the utility of a unit of conventional product, 0ib  is the quality augmenta-
tion parameter of the GM product discussed earlier, and 0 is the maximum disutility of
a unit of GM product (for the consumers with 1 ). The prices of non-GM and GM
products are denoted 0p and ip , respectively. Consumer differences vis-à-vis GM product
acceptance is captured by postulating that the parameter , in the population of consumers,
is distributed on  0,1 with a distribution function ( )F  . A direct interpretation of equation
(2) is that consumers all place the same value on the quality enhancement but have differ-
ent disutility from the GM attribute. In any event, what formulation (2) maintains is that,
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ceteris paribus, consumers dislike the GM nature of the product irrespective of whether the
GM innovation is of the first or second generation type.7
Segregation and Identity Preservation
In the post-innovation situation, after a GM product has been introduced, SIP costs
are necessary for the conventional non-GM product to be sold as such to consumers.
Some SIP activities are also necessary for the quality-improved product to retain enough
purity of its valuable character (Bender et al. 1999). We model such costs by a constant
unit segregation cost undertaken by the non-GM product ( is ) and by the GM-product
( i). Of course, when the GM product is a first-generation product, with 0ib  , no
segregation cost is required for the GM product (i.e., in that case 0i ).
Furthermore, we wish to account for the additional costs of a system of mandatory
GM labeling and GM traceability such as the one implemented by the EU. This addi-
tional burden is represented by the unit cost it that must be incurred by the GM product
(as in Lapan and Moschini 2004). Because the suppliers of a pure first-generation product
(with 0ib  ) have no incentive to do any segregation at all, for such a producer the EU
regulations can be seen as adding a new additional cost. For the suppliers of a second-
generation good, on the other hand, some of the activities required by the EU rules are
likely to be undertaken voluntarily as part of the effort to capture the additional value of
the innovation.8
Innovating Firm
Assuming that the GM product is fully protected by appropriate intellectual property
rights (a patent, for example), the innovator has a temporary monopoly that allows it to
profit from the innovation (Moschini and Lapan 1997). Because we have assumed a
constant-returns-to-scale agricultural industry, it is not necessary that we explicitly model
the innovation adoption by farmers. Instead, we can think of the innovator as producing
the GM product directly and selling it to final users.
The demand for the innovation can be derived from the preference structure that was
postulated. To this end, we postulate that the individual preference parameter , in the
population of consumers, is distributed on  0,1 with a distribution function ( )F  . The
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distribution function ( )F  is assumed to be strictly increasing and twice differentiable.
We also assume that u is large enough to have a“covered market”outcome such that all
consumers buy one unit of the good (either conventional or GM product). From our
consumer preference specification, an individual with preference parameter will buy
the GM product if and only if 0 iV V , which requires
0
0
ˆ(1 ) i ii i i
ub p p
u p u b p  

         . (3)
At given prices ip and 0p , the quantity of GM product sold on the market is
ˆ( )i iQ NF  , where N is the market size (e.g., the number of consumers). Without loss
of generality, we can normalize the market size and give 1N  . Given that, the profit of
the GM innovator is
 ˆ( ) ( )i i i i i iF p c a t        . (4)
Noting that from (3) we can write 0iˆ i iub p p   , and giving 0 ip c s  as dictated
by the assumed competitive conditions for the farm sector, the innovator’s profit-
maximization problem can be stated as
 ˆ ˆmax ( )ˆ i i i i
i
F r  

  (5)
where we have used the definition i i i i i ir ub a s t     .
Results
The simple model outlined in the foregoing permits us to derive some important con-
clusions. The optimality condition for the program in (5), for an interior solution
*ˆ0 1i  , is9
 * * *ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 0i i i if r F       (6)
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where ( ) ( )f F  denotes the density function of the distribution of consumer types.
The second-order sufficient condition for an interior solution is
*
*
ˆ( )
1 0ˆ( )
i
i
Fd
d f

 
  
         
. (7)
Thus, a sufficient condition that guarantees that (7) holds is
( )
0
( )
d F
d f

 
  
 
. (8)
This condition that the ratio ( ) ( )F f  is nondecreasing, sometimes referred to as the
“monotone hazard rate property,”is often invoked in the mechanism design literature
(e.g., Laffont and Tirole 1993, chap. 1) and it is satisfied if the distribution function ( )F 
is log-concave, a property enjoyed by most commonly used distributions (such as the
uniform, the exponential and the normal). The condition in (8) will be assumed to hold
from this point onward.
Given the optimality condition in (6), the maximized profit of the innovator is
 
2*
* * *
*
ˆ( )ˆ ˆ( ) ˆ( )
i
i i i i
i
F
F r
f
 
  

      . (9)
From the optimality condition in equation (6), and given that the condition in (8) holds, it
follows that
*ˆ
0i
ir
 

and
*ˆ
0i


 

. (10)
Recalling the definition i i i i i ir ub a s t     , the comparative statics results in (10)
immediately establish the behavior of the adoption rate with respect to the parameters of
the problem. Furthermore, from (9),    * *ˆsign signi i i ir r      if the monotone
hazard rate condition in (8) holds. Hence, we can conclude the following.
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RESULT 1. Adoption of the GM product, and the profit of the innovator, are (i) an increas-
ing function of the quality improvement ib and of the efficiency gain ia ; (ii) a decreasing
function of the consumer GM disutility parameter ; (iii) inversely related to the (GM
product) segregation cost i and directly related to the (conventional product) segrega-
tion cost is ; and (iv) inversely related to the “regulation cost” it .
This result clearly summarizes some of the main features of GM product innovation.
Both quality improvements and efficiency gains can further GM product adoption and
provide profit incentives for innovators. Segregation costs—unnecessary in the pre-
innovation situation but critically necessary in the post-GM innovation case—play a
significant and subtle role. In particular, segregation costs that have to be borne by GM
producers discourage adoption, but the extent of the segregation costs that have to be
incurred by the producers of the conventional product to supply non-GM product has a
positive impact on GM crop adoption and innovators’profit.
Welfare
For a GM innovation characterized by the cost-decreasing parameter ia and the qual-
ity-increasing parameter ib , if 0W represents the level of welfare prior to the innovation
and iW represents the welfare after the innovation, for a given adoption level ˆwe have
0W u c  (11)
    ˆ0ˆ1 ( ) (1 ) ( )i i i i i iW u c s F u b c a t dF              . (12)
Evaluating the latter at the innovator’s profit-maximizing solution *ˆ iˆ  we obtain
 * * *ˆ( )i i iW u c s H       (13)
where *i is given by equation (9) and  *ˆ* *0ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ii iH dF     . From (11) to (13)
we therefore obtain
* * *
0
ˆ( )i i iW W s H      . (14)
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Hence, we have the following.
RESULT 2. For negligible segregation cost for the non-GM product (i.e., 0is  ) the GM
innovation is welfare increasing. For a given disutility parameter 0 , however, the
need for segregation costs may entail that the GM innovation decreases welfare.
The first part of Result 2 follows from the observation that *ˆ( ) 0iH   and * 0i 
whenever *ˆ 0i . To see the second part of Result 2 it suffices to observe the behavior of
the welfare function for low equilibrium adoption rates: because *ˆ( ) 0iH   and * 0i 
whenever *ˆ 0i , then  * 0 0i iW W s   as *ˆ 0i . But it should be clear that
welfare can be decreased by the innovation even for large adoption rates. Indeed, note
that if is is large enough we obtain the corner solution with
*ˆ 1i . Specifically, com-
plete adoption obtains when 1 1 (1)ir f . And with complete adoption the
equilibrium welfare is
1* *
0
( ) (1 ) ( )i i iW u c s dF         . (15)
Given that in this corner solution case we have *i r   , and recalling that
i i i i i ir ub a s t     , the condition
    1
0
1 1 (1) ( )i i i i i if ub a s t s dF            (16)
would ensure both a corner solution with complete adoption and the decreased welfare
result * 0iW W .
Thus, Result 2 displays the conclusion that an efficiency enhancing (or quality en-
hancing) innovation may turn out to be welfare decreasing because it brings about a novel
market failure, a type of externality (i.e., the need for hitherto unnecessary SIP activities
for the pre-existing non-GM product to be available as such to consumers).10
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Moving on to analyze the impact of an EU-style mandatory labeling regime, note
that, because *ˆ 0i it  and * 0i it  , from (13) it is clear that * 0i iW t  . Hence,
we have the following.
RESULT 3. Taking for given that GM products are introduced, regulation that increases
the cost of GM product marketing but does not affect the SIP costs for the non-GM
product, such as the EU labeling and traceability requirements, reduces welfare.
Results 1 and 2 summarize conclusions that, in one form or another, have appeared
in various studies that have attempted an assessment of the economic implications of the
introduction of GM products. Earlier studies documented sizeable efficiency gains from
new GM crops (e.g., Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky 2000; Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and
Nelson 2000) but ignored the critical element of this new technology discussed in the
introduction: consumer preferences and the inferior-substitute nature of first-generation
GM products. Once the“unintended”economic effects of GM crop innovations are
accounted for, the efficiency and welfare implications of first-generation GM products
are ambiguous at best (e.g., Fulton and Giannakas 2004; Furtan, Gray, and Holzman
2003; Lapan and Moschini 2004; Sobolevsky, Moschini, and Lapan 2005). A version of
Result 3 can be found in Lapan and Moschini (2004). None of these studies concerned
the potential impact of second-generation GM products. The model that we have outlined
provides a useful starting point in that direction.
Choice of Research Direction
Many a commentator has lamented the fact that input-trait GM products, which of-
fered no direct benefit to the consumer, were the first and most visible output of the
biotechnology industry. The (somewhat plausible but untested) presumption here is that,
had output-trait GM product been marketed first, consumer acceptance would have been
different. Whether or not that is true, there are technological reasons as to why the
biotechnology industry went the way it did: input traits based on a single-gene transfor-
mation (such as Roundup Ready soybeans or Bt maize) are easier than the multiple-gene
transformations often associated with quality improvements. But the question remains as
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to whether there are other explanations, and in particular whether the inherent market
failure of GM innovation (the concomitant creation of the need for costly SIP) also had
an effect.
To try to address this question in the context of our simple model, consider an inno-
vator facing two possible innovations, a purely efficiency-enhancing innovation and a
pure quality-enhancing innovation. Thus, 1i denotes a“first-generation” GM product 
whereby 1 0a a  and 1 0b  . Similarly, 2i denotes a“second-generation”GM
product, whereby 2 0a  and 2 0b b  . Figure 2 illustrates. Given this choice of re-
search direction, we want to know what factors determine the choice of the innovators
and whether the private choice of the innovating firm is consistent with the direction that
maximizes social welfare.
Ex post, from the innovating firm’s point of view, the first-generation (i.e., cost re-
ducing) innovation is more attractive if * *1 2  . From equation (9) we have
2 2* *
1 2* *
1 2 * *
1 2
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
F F
f f
 
 
 
         (17)
c
c a
1 b1
quality
unit cost
●
●
●
conventional
product
potential new
GM products
FIGURE 2. First-generation and second-generation genetically modified products
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and thus, assuming that the monotone hazard rate condition in equation (8) holds, we can
conclude that the innovation providing the highest profit to the innovator is the one that
would attain the highest adoption rate (in the monopoly pricing equilibrium); that is,
* * * *
1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ      . Hence, given the choice between the two innovations, the condition
for * *1 2  reduces to
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2( ) ( ) ( )a s t ub s t a ub s s t t                  . (18)
Without externality effects, that is, with 0i i is t   , the choice of research direction
depends only on the magnitude of cost reduction relative to the quality enhancement, so
that * *1 2  if and only if a ub . With external effects, however, it is clear that the
choice of the innovator is affected by the presence of segregation costs.
To consider the welfare-maximizing research direction, conditional on the innova-
tion being provided by an innovator-monopolist, the condition is
    * * * * * *1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2ˆ ˆ( ) ( )W W H H s s          . (19)
From equation (19) we can conclude the following.
RESULT 4. With 1 2s s the social ordering of the research directions is the same as the
private ordering (based on the innovator’s profit functions). With 1 2s s , however, that
need not be the case. Specifically, with 1 2s s the rule for the privately chosen research
direction is tilted in favor of efficiency-enhancing innovations.
To show Result 4, recall the definition  *ˆ* *0ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ii iH dF     , so that it follows that
   * * * *1 2 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )sign H H sign      . Also, because we have shown that
* * * *
1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ      , then    * * * *1 2 1 2ˆ ˆsign sign      . Hence, with 1 2s s , the social
ordering of the research directions is the same as the private ordering (based on the innova-
tor’s profit functions). The case 1 2s s is of interest under the presumption that when the
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GM product carries out its own SIP (the incentive for which exists for quality-improving
innovations), it is less costly for the non-GM product to achieve a given SIP level.
Conclusion
GM product innovations clearly increase the efficiency of production and also have
the potential to offer new and/or quality-improved products to the consumer. But because
some consumers are apparently opposed to the GM technology of the new products, a
portion of the market has a preference for the pre-existing conventional products. Regula-
tions aimed at ensuring the consumers’“right to know”about the GM nature of the food
consumed, so as to preserve their ability to choose, require some form of GM labeling. In
particular, for example, the new 2004 EU regulations have introduced mandatory labeling
and traceability of all GM food and food ingredients and of GM feed. To fulfill such
requirements requires costly steps to be undertaken by the suppliers of GM products.
Somewhat paradoxically, however, it does not seem that the new regulations make it
easier to supply non-GM products to consumers, because costly segregation and identity
preservation (SIP) activities are still required.
In this paper we have reviewed some of the significant issues concerning the effects
of GM product innovation, with an emphasis on the issues of GM regulations that focus
on labeling. We have developed a simple model that allows a characterization of the main
features of both first- and second-generation GM product innovation, and we have used
that model to offer an interpretative review of some of the existing studies that have dealt
with the assessment of the economic impacts of GM product innovation. We can con-
clude that introduction of GM products entails the real possibility of a welfare-decreasing
innovation because of the externality-like effects that it has on the agricultural and food
system’s ability to deliver non-GM products. But because the costly SIP activities need to
be undertaken by the suppliers of the superior (non-GM) products, it is also apparent that
EU-style mandatory labeling of GM products cannot help (taking for given that GM
products are introduced), and indeed it is itself a wasteful regulation in our model. We
have also shown that the existence and nature of SIP costs may have a role in the choice
of research directions by GM innovating firms.
Endnotes
1. The United States, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and China accounted for about 96
percent of total GM crop cultivation in 2004 (James 2005).
2. Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell (2001) provide a useful introduction and a review of the
literature.
3. See Tirole (1988, chap. 2) for definitions and an introduction.
4. The StarLink case is a good example. Traces of an unapproved (for human consump-
tion) GM maize were found in taco shells sold in U.S. grocery stores by tests carried
out by an independent lab on behalf of a coalition of consumer and environmental
organizations, prompting Kraft Foods to recall 2.5 million boxes of Taco Bell–brand
taco shells. See Taylor and Tick (2003) for more details and a complete chronology
of the StarLink case and for a discussion of related regulatory issues.
5. The presence of GM products that are not yet approved in the EU but that have
received a favorable scientific assessment is tolerated up to the stricter threshold of
0.5 percent (marketing of products with more than 0.5 percent of such material is
prohibited).
6. Some of these innovations may be better thought of as increasing expected yields
(e.g., Bt maize). But given our constant unit cost assumption, by duality an increase
in yield is fully equivalent to a decrease in unit cost.
7. Note that this formulation can capture the opposition to GM products that arises
because of perceived shortcomings that are directly borne by the individual (such as,
for example, the risk of an adverse health effect). But in this setting, what consumers
may also care about could be a “public good”—e.g., the environmental implications
of GM products. Arguably, such concerns would not be reflected in the willingness to
pay displayed by private consumption decisions.
8. Thus we may want to think of such costs as being related to the quality of the innova-
tion, i.e., ( ) 0i i it t b  , with ( ) 0i it b  , but in this paper we will not pursue this
hypothesis further.
9. An interior solution is guaranteed if  0 1 1 (1)ir f    .
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10.The “market failure” is not an externality in the usual sense because—to a first
approximation at least—it is the presence of GM products, not the extent of their cul-
tivation, that is the problem (and thus it is essentially a nonconvexity of the aggregate
production set).
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